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7.1  Introduction 
The birthrate in the United States has fluctuated sharply in the past century, 
as shown in figure 7.1, with “baby booms” in 1900-25 and 1947-62 and “baby 
busts” in 1930-46  and after 1962; Census Bureau “low” and “mid” projections 
are that the current bust will continue into the next century. The age composi- 
tion of the population has varied in proportions reflecting the lagged birthrate, 
with  smoothing and stretching due to immigration and changing life expec- 
tancy,  as  shown  in  figure  7.2. If  fertility  rates  remain  at  current  below- 
replacement levels over the coming century, as projected by many demogra- 
phers, then the U.S. population will peak between 2030 and 2050. After this, 
it will under “low” projections decline by 2100 to approximately 1990 levels, 
or under “mid” projections remain almost stationary. The elderly population 
will peak around 2035, as the  1947-62  baby-boom cohorts pass age 65, but 
increasing longevity will keep the elderly dependency ratio’ high through the 
end of the next century. The total dependency ratio will rise sharply after 2010, 
and although it will not reach the historic highs attained at the end of past baby 
booms, the relative shift in dependency toward the elderly will be drastic. If 
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1. The elderly  [resp. youth] dependency ratio equals the population age 65 and over [resp. the 
population age 0-191  divided by the population age 20-64.  The total dependency ratio is the sum 
of the elderly and youth dependency ratios. 
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Fig. 7.2  Dependency ratios 
these demographic projections are correct, then the United States faces a "re- 
gime shift" that will substantially change the characteristics of institutions in- 
fluenced by demographic factors. These changes will in turn have some sig- 
nificant impacts on the welfare of elderly cohorts, particularly those that span 
the regime shift. 
The institution that has perhaps the greatest impact on the welfare of the 
elderly  is the  Social SecurityhVedicare  system. The implications  of  demo- 
graphics for this program have been  investigated in detail, for example, by 
Boskin and Shoven (1987), the Consulting Panel on Society Security (1976), 227  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
Darby (1979), Diamond and Hausman (1984), Hurd (1991), Hurd and Shoven 
(1982), Kotlikoff and Smith (1983), and Poterba and Summers (1987). 
Markets such as health services and housing are also likely to see substantial 
impacts.  Recently,  several  economists  have examined the  impact  of  demo- 
graphics on the housing market. In a seminal paper, Mankiw and Weil (1989) 
show that a simple age-specific housing demand function, combined with de- 
mographic profiles, generates aggregate potential housing demand with sub- 
stantial  intertemporal  variation.  Related  studies  have  been  done  by  Rosen 
(1984) and Russell (1982). Mankiw and Weil argue that real housing stocks 
are not very responsive to housing prices and that the price elasticity of demand 
is low. They conclude that the demographic  swings will be converted in this 
relatively  rigid market into large swings in housing prices  and that  the past 
pattern of housing wealth generated by  real capital gains will be largely re- 
versed in coming decades. Figures 7.3-7.5  give time series for real housing 
stock, the demographic component of potential housing demand as defined by 
Mankiw and Weil, and real housing prices. The construction of these series is 
detailed in section 7.3. The high correlations among these three series (.9668 
between  stock and the demographic  factor, 3875 between  stock and price, 
and .9423 between price and the demographic factor) are consistent with the 
economic hypothesis that demographics are causal to housing stock and price. 
Housing equity is the most important asset of most elderly households, and 
for many is the only significant asset; see McFadden (1994). The 1983 Survey 
of Consumer Finances finds that in the population over age 65, 69 percent of 
net worth is in house equity. The 1984 Survey of Income and Program Partici- 
pation finds that 73 percent of households over age 65 have equity in a home 
and that the median equity among holders was $46,192. The only other assets 
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held by a majority of households are bank accounts and equity in automobiles, 
and the medians among holders of these assets total less than $17,000. Further, 
a substantial fraction of  home equity held by  current elderly cohorts comes 
from capital gains.  For example, from figure 7.5, real capital  gains created 
more than a third of the equity of a household that purchased a house in 1945 
at age 30 and that sold it in 1980 to finance retirement. Then, variations in real 
housing prices that affect net equity can have a significant impact on the wealth 
of the elderly and on intergenerational distribution of welfare. The increasing 
importance of housing equity as an asset in recent decades-from  22 percent 229  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
of holdings in 1965, to a high of  34 percent in 1979, and to 31 percent in 1988, 
according to Federal Reserve Board balance sheets (C-9)-combined  with the 
high volatility  of  housing  prices,  has increased  the riskiness  of  consumers’ 
asset portfolios. The potential welfare effects are particularly large if the price 
changes are unanticipated,  so that  households  have a significant fraction of 
their assets at risk and are unable to adjust savings and bequest behavior  in 
anticipation of market variations. It remains true if the price changes are pre- 
dictable,  but  myopia  or credit  constraints  prevent  households  from forming 
intertemporally consistent life-cycle savings plans. 
This paper examines the long-run behavior  of  the  housing  market  in re- 
sponse to demographic swings and the consequences of market characteristics 
for the welfare of current and future cohorts of  the elderly. Section 7.2 uses a 
simple  demographic  model,  along  with  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 
middle-range assumptions, to project population by age over the next century. 
Section 7.3 assembles measures of per capita income, quality-adjusted housing 
stock, real housing price, and the real user cost of owner-occupied  housing. 
Section 7.4 examines the age distribution of housing consumption and income 
and its stability over time. Section 7.5 obtains estimates of demand and supply 
elasticities, using aggregate data and information from various censuses. Sec- 
tion 7.6 assembles these components and forecasts  market-clearing  housing 
prices and stocks. Section 7.7 analyzes the welfare impacts on successive el- 
derly cohorts of these housing market variations. 
7.2  Demographics 
Estimates and “mid-range” forecasts of the U.S. population by age and sex, 
from the US. Census, are given in tables 7.1-7.3  for the years  1900-2100. 
Historical estimates are from Historical  Statistics of  the United States (US. 
Department  of  Commerce, 1975), and Statistical Abstract  (U.S. Department 
of  Commerce, various years).  Projections  are from Spencer (1989). For in- 
tercensus years after 2050, and all years after 2080, I complete the table using 
a cohort-component projection procedure plus the fertility rate lagged one pe- 
riod; see Haub (1987) for an explanation of  this methodology. For years prior 
to  1940, it was necessary to disaggregate census tables for persons over age 
65. This was done using contemporaneous life tables, as described below. 
A critical component of projections of the elderly population is an assump- 
tion about mortality trends. I followed the actuarial approach used by Spencer 
(1989) and Palmer (1989), fitting Gompertz curves in each census year to age- 
specific death rates after age 55. The death rate H per 1,000 persons of age A 
and sex i in year t is approximated by the function 
(1) 
The estimates for the Gompertz coefficients, along with projections past 1990, 
are given in table 7.4. 
H = exP(at, + P,,A). 230  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.1  US. Census Estimates and Projections of Male Population by Age, 
Middle Series P-25, 1989 (thousands) 
Age Group 











































4,655  4,500 
5,047  4,638 
5,420  4,959 
5.881  5,504 
5,910  5,805 
6,325  6.051 
5,826  6,403 
5,188  5,916 
5,378  5,442 
6,513  5,542 
8,314  6.778 
9.411  8,495 
10,337  9,563 
10,070  10,367 
8.869  10,312 
8,240  8,972 
8.423  8,601 
9,213  8,610 
9,426  9,408 
9.1 18  9,609 
8,661  9,683 
8,517  9,165 
8,668  9,062 
8,829  9,305 
8,768  9,546 
8,544  9,495 
8,357  9,283 
8,300  9,125 
8,308  9,123 
8,267  9,165 
8,143  9,122 
8,136  8,985 
7.916  8,853 
7,864  8,613 
7,823  8,777 
7,803  8,731 
7,661  8,679 
7,626  8,522 
7,586  8,483 
7,552  8,438 



















































































3,642  3,339 
4,014  3,657 
4,613  4,275 
4,642  4,460 
4,568  4,579 
4,838  4,612 
5,355  4,877 
5.635  5,232 
5,716  5.474 
6,138  5,724 
5.659  6.028 
5,329  5,833 
5,568  5,422 
6,903  5,607 
8.029  6,715 
9,839  8.617 
10.71 1  9,776 
10,708  I 1,007 
9,427  10,818 
8,830  9,526 
8,799  8,881 
9,807  8,875 
10,178  9,871 
9,857  10,223 
9,350  9,928 
9,251  9,41  I 
9,521  9,314 
9,747  9,568 
9,675  9,790 
9,641  9,712 
9,463  9,675 
9,452  9.496 
9,492  9,485 
9,448  9,525 
9,320  9,496 
9,198  9,368 
9,141  9,239 
9,122  9,182 
8,905  9,162 
8,853  8,945 








































































9,8  11 
9,728 
9,692 
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Table 7.1  (continued) 
Age Group 










































1,150  921 
1,382  990 
1,499  1.195 
1,890  1,252 
1,897  1,596 
2,272  1,612 
2,434  1,949 
2,780  2,060 
3,024  2,408 
3,413  2,734 
3.664  3,067 
3,825  3,317 
4,144  3,413 
4,578  3,639 
4,834  4,084 
5,048  4,368 
5,522  4,704 
5,383  5,118 
5,071  5,032 
6,386  4,763 
6,419  4,952 
8,169  6,000 
9,180  7,648 
10,158  8,583 
10,092  9,523 
8,872  9,455 
8,229  8,314 
8,215  7,697 
9,107  7,680 
9,426  8,509 
9,120  8,804 
8,619  8,518 
8,502  8,051 
8,722  7,942 
8,930  8,160 
8,869  8,354 
8,844  8,293 
8,690  8,269 
8,688  8,125 
8,733  8,123 
8,701  8,165 
724  446 
753  508 
834  569 
953  657 
967  707 
1.213  845 
1,300  936 
1,486  1,098 
1,680  1,241 
1,930  1,419 
2,446  1,645 
2,711  1,914 
2,939  2,193 
2,934  2,342 
3,166  2.342 
3,596  2,441 
3,948  2,894 
4,254  3,213 
4,655  3,516 
4,603  3,873 
4,144  3,697 
4,444  3,498 
5,400  3,771 
6,881  4,586 
7,742  5,860 
8,585  6.590 
8,526  7,309 
7,483  7,245 
6.925  6,356 
6,906  5,878 
7,648  5,860 
7,913  6,490 
7,656  6,715 
7,236  6,497 
7,149  6,150 
7,346  6,076 
7,516  6,239 
7,461  6,384 
7,439  6,337 
7,309  6,319 










































106  36 
147  54 
170  65 
203  80 
244  100 
259  96 
321  134 
397  171 
443  187 
526  236 
470  209 
550  258 
639  288 
734  336 
801  398 
904  455 
989  502 
1,086  566 
1,350  627 
1,548  752 
1,786  915 
1,988  1,016 
1,996  1,147 
1,908  1,161 
1,908  1,113 
2,325  1,112 
2,969  1,356 
3,333  1,728 
3,689  1,939 
3,653  2,145 
3,201  2,123 
2,959  1,861 
2,950  1,720 
3,268  1,715 
3,386  1,902 
3,282  1,971 
3,104  1,909 
3,065  1,806 
3,148  1,783 
3,221  1,831 










































1  38,867  1900 
2  42,965  1905 
3  47,554  1910 
3  51,573  1915 
4  54,291  1920 
3  58,813  1925 
7  62,297  1930 
9  64,110  1935 
9  66,352  1940 
15  70,035  1945 
14  75,539  1950 
21  82,030  1955 
19  89,320  1960 
24  95,609  1965 
40  100,266  1970 
44  105,366  1975 
46  110,888  1980 
55  116,648  1985 
70  122,243  1990 
84  127,123  1995 
109  131,191  2000 
145  134,858  2005 
186  138,333  2010 
223  141,393  2015 
256  144,035  2020 
260  145,717  2025 
249  146,543  2030 
248  146,711  2035 
302  146.454  2040 
385  145,950  2045 
431  145,320  2050 
490  144,824  2055 
472  144,046  2060 
430  143,224  2065 
383  142,915  2070 
401  142,621  2075 
424  141.722  2080 
470  140,847  2085 
458  139,909  2090 
437  138,937  2095 
434  137,947  2100 232  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.2  U.S. Census Estimates and Projections of Female Population by Age, 
Middle Series P-25, 1989 (thousands) 
Age Group 




































































































































































































































9,7  15 
9,385 
8,888 
8,57  1 
8,82  I 
9,046 
9,001 
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Table 7.2  (continued) 
Age Group 
50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  90-94  95+  Total  Year 
1,395  1,079 
1,465  1,236 
1,801  1,307 
1,916  1,627 
2,217  1.682 
2,467  2,033 
2,853  2,227 
3,123  2,605 
3,513  2,840 
3,834  3,269 
4,159  3,618 
4,373  3,932 
4,901  4,326 
5,343  4,916 
5,786  5,225 
6,235  5,598 
6.104  6,148 
5,661  5,960 
5,949  5,552 
7,102  5,842 
8,872  6,896 
9,864  8,671 
10,810  9,646 
10,582  10,559 
9,291  10,344 
8,597  9,088 
8,597  8,412 
9,532  8,412 
9,890  9,330 
9,581  9,689 
9,099  9,391 
8,792  8,918 
9,045  8,600 
9,272  8,847 
9,225  9,075 
9,022  9,029 
8,887  8,830 
8,908  8,698 
8,976  8,718 
8,963  8,784 
8,859  8,772 
885  539  340  190  89  31  8  I  37,227  1990 
929  709  494  304  157  61  16  2  40,857  1905 
1,088  788  558  350  183  73  20  3  44,853  1910 
1,131  899  641  406  216  89  25  4  48.973  1915 
1,412  927  692  457  252  107  30  5  52,170  1920 
1,461  1,147  826  525  276  108  27  3  57,016  1925 
1,815  1,217  915  616  353  159  50  9  60,780  1930 
1,923  1,372  1,067  746  444  208  68  13  63,140  1935 
2,336  1,603  1,262  890  532  247  77  13  65,770  1940 
2,812  1,821  1,433  1.024  633  312  110  23  69,893  1945 
3,033  2,700  1,738  1,109  552  277  99  21  76,146  1950 
3,491  2,947  2,196  1,407  678  358  138  33  83,246  1955 
3.741  3,347  2,574  1,712  859  444  163  35  91,352  1960 
4,053  3,532  2,981  2,057  1,039  549  206  45  98,694  1966 
4,624  3,858  3,121  2,281  1,224  714  317  92  104,613  1970 
5,031  4,536  3,344  2,593  1,506  905  419  128  110,606  1975 
5,431  4,903  3,978  2,973  1,753  1,081  518  166  116,866  1980 
5,877  5,176  4,352  3,360  2,017  1,265  623  209  122,631  1985 
5,708  5,596  4,605  3.691  2,478  1,438  652  247  128,167  1990 
5,333  5,453  5.001  3,939  2,766  1,682  799  321  133.016  1995 
5,561  4,974  4,901  4,413  3,242  2,112  1,017  437  137,076  2000 
6,655  5,255  4,561  4,312  3,595  2,311  1,229  583  140,746  2005 
8,373  6,300  4,658  4,035  3,541  2,600  1,382  750  144,241  2010 
9,306  7,921  5,803  4,286  3,322  2,579  1,576  896  147,504  2015 
10,194  8,809  7,301  5,344  3,532  2,421  1,564  1,022  150,329  2020 
9,993  9,656  8,125  6,728  4,406  2,576  1,469  1,015  152,535  2025 
8,782  9,469  8,910  7,490  5,550  3,215  1,564  954  154,086  2030 
8,129  8,322  8,737  8,213  6,178  4,049  1,951  1,015  155,014  2035 
8.132  7,706  7,681  8,057  6,777  4,509  2,459  1,268  155,353  2040 
9,027  7,715  7.118  7,089  6,653  4,950  2,740  1,598  155,150  2045 
9,379  8,569  7,131  6,573  5,857  4,862  3,010  1,782  154,529  2050 
9,091  8,903  7,920  6,584  5,431  4,280  2,957  2,041  153,893  2055 
8,615  8,611  8,211  7,297  5,429  3,961  2,598  1,919  152,917  2060 
8,308  8,160  7,942  7,566  6,017  3,959  2,403  1,780  152.318  2065 
8,552  7,874  7,531  7,323  6,243  4,391  2,404  1,561  151,727  2070 
8,772  8,106  7,267  6,944  6,042  4,555  2,666  1,666  151,262  2075 
8,727  8,314  7,480  6,700  5,729  4,409  2,766  1,732  150,513  2080 
8,535  8,272  7,673  6,897  5,528  4,181  2,677  1,902  149,877  2085 
8,407  8,089  7,634  7,075  5,690  4,034  2,538  1,852  149,190  2090 
8,427  7,968  7,465  7,038  5,837  4,152  2,449  1,767  148,592  2095 
8,491  7,987  7,354  6,883  5,807  4,259  2,521  1,716  148,031  2100 234  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.3  US.  Census Estimates and Projections of Total Population by Age, Middle 






































































































































































17,35  1 
17.250 




7,62  I 
8,607 
9,123 





































































































































































































































































I0,93  I 
1 1,380 
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Table 7.3  (continued) 
Age Group 

































































20,7  18 
20,436 
17,960 















1,806  1,264 
1,920  1,463 
2.282  1,622 
2,384  1,852 
3,008  1,894 
3,073  2,360 
3,764  2,516 
3.983  2,858 
4,744  3,283 
5,547  3,751 
6,099  5,146 
6,807  5,658 
7,154  6,285 
7,692  6,466 
8,708  7,023 
9,399  8,132 
10,135  8,850 
10,995  9,430 
10,740  10,251 
10,096  10,056 
10,513  9,118 
12,656  9,699 
16,022  11,700 
17,888  14,802 
19,717  16,551 
19,448  18,242 
17,096  17,995 
15,826  15,805 
15,813  14,631 
17,537  14,621 
18,183  16,217 
17,609  16,816 
16,666  16,268 
16,249  15,397 
16,712  15,024 
17,126  15,451 
17,020  15,830 
16,804  15,732 
16,532  15,529 
16,550  15,278 






















































3,08  1 























































































































































2  76,094  1900 
4  83,822  1905 
6  92,407  1910 
7  100,546  1915 
9  106,461  1920 
6  115,829  1925 
16  123,077  1930 
22  127,250  1935 
22  132,122  1940 
38  139,928  1945 
35  151,685  1950 
54  165,276  1955 
54  180,672  1960 
69  194,303  1965 
133  204,879  1970 
172  215,972  1975 
213  227,754  1980 
264  239,279  1985 
317  250,410  1990 
405  260,139  1995 
546  268,267  2000 
728  275,604  2005 
937  282,574  2010 
1,118  288,897  2015 
1,278  294,364  2020 
1,275  298,252  2025 
1,203  300,629  2030 
1,264  301,725  2035 
1,570  301,807  2040 
1,983  301,100  2045 
2,213  299,849  2050 
2,532  298.717  2055 
2,391  296,963  2060 
2,210  295,542  2065 
1,944  294,642  2070 
2,066  293,883  2075 
2,155  292,235  2080 
2,372  290,724  2085 
2,311  289,098  2090 
2,204  287,529  2095 
2,150  285,978  2100 236  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.4  Gompertz Approximation to Death Rate per 1,000 Population, 
exp(cw + p Age), with Linear Spline Extrapolation 
Male  Female 













































-  1.25  I 
-  1.332 
-  1.304 
-  1.277 
-  1.249 




-  1.089 
-  1.227 
-  1.365 
-  1.503 
-  1.641 

































































-  1.323 
-1.411 
-  1.498 
-  1.586 
-  1.674 
-  1.777 
-1.881 
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0.09  1 
0.09  1 
0.091 
0.09  1 
0.091 
0.09  1 
0.09  I 
0.091 
0.09  I 
0.09 I 
0.091 
0.09  I 
0.09 1 
0.09 1 
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For interpolation  or extrapolation  of  population  by  the cohort-component 
method, the survivor rates implied by the Gompertz model can be used directly. 
Reconstruction  of  the elderly  age distribution  requires further  assumptions. 
Suppose one starts with a population with a stationary age distribution growing 
at rate g;  this ignores the drift in the life tables, the age distribution of immi- 
grants,  and  variations  in birth  and immigration  rates.  Then, the population 
N(i,  A, t)  of  sex i and age A at date t satisfies 
(2) 
implying that the age distribution past age A, satisfies 
dlogN(i, A, t)/dA = -g -  exp(cr, + p,A)/1000, 
(3)  N(i, A, tJ/N(i,  A,,  to) = exp 
This formula with g equal to the average population growth rate over the past 
30 years and the contemporary Gompertz coefficients was used to estimate the 
age distribution past age 65 from 1900 to 1940. There are two potential biases 
in these estimates. Increasing life expectancy over time leads one to overesti- 
mate the number of very old, while the effect of immigration at mostly younger 
ages leads one to underestimate the number of very old. 
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 show survivor curves at various dates, obtained using 
equation (3) with Gompertz distribution parameters projected by  fitting a lin- 
ear spline to the coefficients in table 7.4. Table 7.5 compares the survivor rates 
implied by  the Gompertz trend  fits with the Census Bureau "mid"  mortality 
assumptions. The Gompertz curves give slightly lower survivor rates for males 
and substantially lower rates for females, in comparison to the Census Bureau 
projections. Manton, Stallard, and Singer (chap. 2 in this volume) emphasize 
that there is considerable uncertainty  in these actuarial trend approaches that 
do not take into account the structural impacts on mortality of shifts in environ- 
mental hazards or in disease-specific treatments. 
Adopting low rather than mid projections would increase the cohort welfare 
shifts found in the final section of this paper. However, the pressures for immi- 
gration of workers created by high dependency ratios in the next century are 
likely to push population closer to the mid projections. 
7.3  Economic Data 
The economic data for this study are drawn from standard sources, mostly 
Historical  Statistics  of  the  United Stutes  (U.S. Department  of  Commerce, 
1975),  and Statistical Abstract (U.S.  Department of Commerce, various years). 
Where necessary, I have spliced and interpolated to construct complete series 
from 1869 through 1989. Table 7.6 gives GNP per capita, and the GNP implicit 
price deflator. These are given by historical series F4 and F5, with the Burgess 238  Daniel McFadden 
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Fig. 7.6  Male survivor rates (Gompertz approximations) 
0 
50  60  70  80  90  100 
Age 
Fig. 7.7  Female survivor rates (Gompertz approximations) 
cost-of-living index (Historical Series El  84) used to interpolate within each 
decade from 1869 to 1888. 
Table 7.7 gives, in successive columns, the residential investment compo- 
nent of  the GNP implicit price deflator, a construction cost index (in current 
dollars),  a  constant-quality  construction  cost  index  (in  current  dollars),  a 
quality-adjusted housing price index (in 1982 dollars), real housing investment 
(in  1982 dollars), and real housing stock (in 1982 dollars). The construction 
cost index is the Boeckh construction cost index (Historical Series N121) for 
small residential buildings after  1914. From  1889 through  1914, the Blank 239  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
Table 7.5  Survivor Rates 
1990  2020 
Start Age  End Age  Census*  Gompertzb  Census'  Gompertzb 
Males 
65-69  70-74  0.826  0.794  0.853  0.836 
75-79  80-84  0.659  0.640  0.703  0.685 
85-89  90-94  0.400  0.396  0.480  0.431 
65-69  70-74  0.907  0.85  1  0.923  0.892 
75-79  80-84  0.784  0.725  0.829  0.783 
85-89  90-94  0.518  0.484  0.6  16  0.567 
5hare of individuals in one cohort who survive in  the following cohort, Census P-25 assump- 
tions, 1988. 
bProjections from Gompertz distribution trends. 
Females 
Table 7.6  Population and GNP 
GNP per 
GNP  Capita 
Price  (1982  Population 
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Price  (1982  Population 























































2787  70,388 
2996  7 1,773 
3006  73,186 
3222  74,626 
3257  75,995 
3560  76,094 
3521  77,580 
3628  79,096 
3518  80,641 
3702  82,216 
405 3  83,822 
4043  85,473 
364 1  87,156 
4156  88,872 
4185  90,622 
4230  92,407 
440 1  93,980 
4353  95,580 
4082  97,208 
3988  98,863 
4243  100,546 
4220  101,702 
4739  102,872 
4514  104,054 
4237  105,251 
3792  106,46  1 
4333  108,272 
(continued) 240  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.6  (continued) 
~ 
GNP per 
GNP  Capita 
Price  (1982  Population 
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245,05  I 
247,350 
residential construction cost index (Historical Series N139) is spliced in, and 
from 1869 through 1888, the Riggleman building cost index (Historical Series 
N138) is spliced in. Taking the quality adjustment in the GNP implicit price 
component for housing as correct, the ratio of  the construction  cost index to 
the GNP residential investment deflator gives an index of  housing quality for 
the years 1929-88.  The annual growth rate of housing quality over this period, 
0.26 percent, is assumed to have prevailed over the period  1869-1 928. Then, 241  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
Table 7.7  Housing Price, Investment, and Stock 
Residential 
Investment  Constant-  Real  Real 
Component of  Quality  House  Housing  Housing 
GNP Implicit  Construction  Construction  Price Index  Investment  Stock 
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Table 7.7  (continued) 
Residential 
Investment  Constant-  Real  Real 
Component of  Quality  House  Housing  Housing 
GNP Implicit  Construction  Construction  Price Index  Investment  Stock 
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Table 7.7  (continued) 
Residential 
Investment  Constant-  Real  Real 
Component of  Quality  House  Housing  Housing 
GNP Implicit  Construction  Construction  Price Index  Investment  Stock 













































































































































































102,7  14 
84,676 
1223  19 
145,166 


































deflating the construction cost index by  the quality index gives the constant- 
quality construction cost index. This is divided by the GNP total implicit price 
deflator to give the housing price index. Note that for the period  1929-88,  the 
housing price index coincides with the ratio of the GNP residential investment 
implicit price index to the GNP total implicit price index. This housing price 
index does nor include land cost and hence probably systematically understates 
the growth in real housing prices. If  prices of  existing dwellings were deter- 
mined by the cost of new dwellings at the margin, this index would be reason- 
ably accurate for all housing. However, the substantial urbanization and growth 
of cities over the last century, with increased transportation cost from the pe- 
riphery to the center, has probably increased the value of  sites near the center 244  Daniel McFadden 
of cities relative to sites at the edge and hence increased the gap between aver- 
age prices of existing dwellings and of new dwellings, adjusting for quality. In 
addition, population  migration between regions creates a gap between  sales- 
weighted prices of  existing dwellings and prices of new dwellings. Taken to- 
gether, these reservations suggest that the housing price index be treated with 
caution. 
Real housing investment in table 7.5 is obtained by first splicing expendi- 
tures for new residential construction  (Historical Series N72,  1869-1914)  to 
value  of  new  residential  construction  put  in place  (Historical  Series  N32, 
191  5-1988),  and then deflating these by the constant-quality construction cost 
index. This is then a constant-quality  real residential investment series. This 
series is then accumulated to obtain a constant-quality residential real capital 
stock. For this accumulation, a depreciation rate of 2.687 percent and a growth 
rate of real investment prior to 1869 of 3.6 percent were assumed. These rates 
were chosen so that the stock series is commensurate with the Department of 
Commerce’s value  of  net  stocks of  residential  structures  (Historical  Series 
N208) between  1925 and 1970. With this construction, the two series have the 
same mean (in 1982 dollars) and a correlation of 0.99964 over this period. 
In the absence of capital market imperfections and transactions costs, there 
is a simple relationship between housing prices and the user cost, or implicit 
rent, for housing. Let P, denote nominal housing price in year t, T,  denote the 
GNP implicit price deflator, Y,  denote the nominal interest rate, tn, denote the 
marginal income tax rate, 6 denote the depreciatiodmaintenance rate, T denote 
the property tax  rate, 0 denote the proportion of property  mortgaged,  and g 
denote the rate of nominal capital gains, g, = (PI+,  -  P,)/P,.  Then, the nominal 
present value of the outlay from a purchase followed by a sale one year later is 
(4)  C,  = (1 -  e)P,  + r,eP, + 6P, + T,  P, -  m,(r,0 + TJP, 
The first term in this expression is the down payment, the second is the mort- 
gage interest payment, the third is the maintenance (to offset depreciation), the 
fourth is the property tax payment, the fifth is the income tax offset from the 
deductability of  mortgage interest and property taxes, and the sixth is the net 
outlay from selling the dwelling and repaying the mortgage, discounted to pe- 
riod t. Neglecting products of small rates and converting to real user cost, equa- 
tion (4) simplifies to 
(5  1  C,  = (P,/T,)[rl(l  -  em,) + ~,(1  -  m,) + 6 -  g,]. 
Ex ante, the consumer must form expectations regarding the nominal capital 
gains rate g,. I consider four simplistic models of expectations: (1) naive expec- 
tations that last year’s rate will continue (LAG]), (2) naive expectations that the 
average rate over the past three years will prevail (LAG3), (3) perfect foresight 
regarding the rate over the next year (LEADl),  and (4) perfect foresight regard- 
ing the rate over the next three years (LEAD3). The perfect foresight models 
+ (1 -  r,)W,  -  P,, ,). 245  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
should capture some of the behavioral response one would expect if consumers 
have forward-looking  rational  expectations,  although  of  course they neglect 
the statistical properties of  rational expectations. 
Table 7.8 gives the real user cost of housing under each of the expectations 
models. The home mortgage  interest rate in this table is the Federal  Home 
Loan Bank Board new home mortgage rate after 1962. From 1919 to 1962, it 
is approximated by  the Moody’s Aaa corporate Bond Rate (Historical Series 
X447), plus the net risk premium that prevailed between these rates in 1963- 
88. From  1869 to 1918, it is approximated by the unadjusted index of yields 
on American railroad bonds (Historical Series 476), plus the sum of the previ- 
ous net risk premium and the net risk premium between corporate and railroad 
bonds that prevailed in  1919-36.  This construction  has some obvious flaws. 
The protected  status of the home mortgage rate from the  1930s through the 
late 1970s produced lower net risk premiums in this era than presumably pre- 
vailed at other times. Then, the splicing used probably overstates home mort- 
gage rates from 1936 to 1962 and understates them earlier than  1936. 
The marginal income tax rate in table 7.8 was calculated by  computing in 
each year average nominal family income for a married couple with two depen- 
dents and, for this income level, taking the marginal tax rate from U.S. Trea- 
sury  data  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce, Statistical  Abstract  1989, table 
511). Prior to 1954, the effective (average) tax rate (Historical Series Y426- 
439) was used, scaled by the ratio of marginal to average rates in 1954-70. This 
construction is biased because adjusted gross income of families is somewhat 
overstated and the progressivity of the tax has changed over time, in addition 
to the obvious bias in using a “representative” family size and income level for 
a rate that is nonlinear over sizes and incomes. 
The nominal annual capital gains rates in table 7.8 are computed from the 
real housing price index in table 7.7 and the GNP implicit price deflator  in 
table 7.6, for each of the expectations models described earlier. The real user 
costs are then calculated for each expectations  model using equation (5) and 
assuming that 70 percent of home purchases  are mortgage financed, that the 
depreciation rate is 2.687 percent, and that the property tax rate is 2 percent.? 
The real user costs are denominated in 1982 dollars, with the price of housing 
indexed to one in this year. 
7.4.  The Age Distribution of Income and Housing Assets 
Mankiw and Weil (1989) have used the 1970 1-in-1,000 Public Use Sample 
from the  U.S. Census,  containing  203,190 individuals  grouped into 74,565 
households, to run the regression 
2. The property tax rate varies widely across states, and its national average has fallen from 2.02 
in 1974 to 1.36 in 1984, a period of extraordinary increases in real housing prices. Table 7.8  User Cost of Housing 
Home  Nominal Annual Capilal Gains Rate  Real User Cost of Housing 
Mortgage  Marginal 
Interest  Income 












































































































-  1.842 
I .724 
0.683 
-  1.562 
-  1.264 
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I .724 
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-  I .562 

































































































































































































-  1.499 
3.172 
3.291 






































I .OX I 
I .700 
I .260 
-  1.084 




























-  I .572 
2.210 
-3.782 
0.3  I7 
2.224 





~  19.805 
-8.124 
1 I .383 
































































































































































0.07 I Table 7.8  (continued) 
Home  Nominal Annual 

























Interest  Income 
















































-1.664  0.214 
-1.326  2.595 
0.806  -0.727 
-  1.684  -0.734 
0.098  -0.260 
4.278  0.897 
-2.6fAl  0.572 
9.909  -2.761 
20.764  -11.100 
-0.733  -  10.459 
10.499  -3.663 
1.002  2.918 
4.911  4.798 
9.153  4.350 
3.439  5.828 
0.562  4.380 
3.306  2.433 
8.814  4.223 
7.180  6.427 
8.199  8.056 
9.337  8.231 
6.199  7.904 
8.382  7.965 
-1.317  -0.734 
0.80~  -0.260 
0.098  0.572 
~  1.669  0.897 
4.371  -2.761 
-2.625  -11.100 
pY.434  -  10.459 
18.750  -3.663 
-0.733  2.91x 
11.070  4.798 
-0.997  4.350 
5.034  5.828 
9.585  4.380 
3.499  2.433 
0.563  4.223 
3.361  6.427 
9.214  8.056 
7.444  8.231 
8.545  7.904 
9.787  7.965 
6.395  10.955 





















0.0 I 5 
0.008 
0.064  0.073 
0.047  0.058 
0.068  0.073 
0.067  0.062 
0.063  0.035 
0.060  0.082 
0.06  I  0. I25 
0.082  0.184 
0.120  -0.006 
0.0~0  0.064 
0.037  0.024 
0.024  -0.005 
0.029  0.034 
0.02~  0.036 
0.028  0.003 
0.125  0.065 
0.020  0.056 
0.042  -0.006 
0.009  -0.006 
-0.004  -0.016 
-0.nn7  0.007 











































































































































































































































































































0.020 Table 7.8  (continued) 
Home  Nominal Annual 
Interest  Income 
Mortgage  Marginal  Capital Gains Rate  Real User Cost of  Housing 






















































































8.700  9.122 
11.200  8.597 
8.800  8.657 
7.000  9.741 
11.4W  11.291 
12.400  10.809 
12.100  9.510 
9.800  6.852 
8.1 00  4.464 
3.500  3.080 
2.200  2.659 
3.700  2.789 
2.200  3.077 




















0.054  0.013 
0.036  -0.008 
0.026  0.020 
0.016  0.035 
0.020  -0.006 
0.019  -0.017 
0.01  I  -0.013 
0.003  0.018 
0.048  0.110 
0.077  0.123 
0.081  0.089 
0.098  0.106 
0.095  0.096 
0.091  0.073 
0.083  0.084 
0.079 
0.021  0.049 
0.009 
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00 
where  h indexes households,  r  indexes census years,  v is the (self-reported) 
value of  the residence,  with the value of rental property  imputed to be  100 
times gross monthly rent, and nohi  is the number of persons of age a in house- 
hold h. Then, the a,,  estimate the consumption  of housing by  age in census 
year t. This formulation does not adjust for economies of scale in household 
formation and thus is likely to overpredict the demand of large households and 
underpredict the demand of small ones; on household formation and housing 
consumption, see Borsch-Supan (1989). 
I extend this approach to the allocation of income, as well as the allocation 
of housing consumption, and address the econometric problem of endogenous 
selection of  tenure status. Analogously to equation (6), consider the regression 
where yhr  is the income of household h in census year r,  and Khlr  is the number 
of household members in cohort i.  Cohort i contains ages a satisfying the ine- 
qualities 5(i -  1) 4 a <  5i, for i = 1, . . . , 19, or the inequality a 2  95 when 
i = 20. The coefficient +,, can be interpreted as the marginal contribution to 
household income from an individual in cohort i in census year r.  Determining 
age-specific income by this imputation method has several advantages. First, 
it avoids the misspecification that occurs when household income is associated 
with the age of the head of the household, since household size, income contri- 
butions from other household members, and the age distribution of household 
members  are all likely to be correlated  with the age of the head. Second, it 
avoids the selection bias that occurs because income of an individual may en- 
dogenously enter the determination of whether the individual lives alone or as 
a member of a larger household, say, with children. 
In setting up a model of housing demand, we will start from an age-specific 
individual indirect utility function and explicitly aggregate to obtain market 
demand. Then, aggregate demand will depend not only on aggregate income 
but also on the age distribution of  this income. Let N,,  denote the population in 
cohort  i in year  r,  and let N, denote the total  population.  Then average real 
income per capita satisfies Y, = C,  N,,+,JN,.  Define an aggregation factor rela- 
tive to a base census year 0, 
If  the age distribution of relative income is stationary, so that an increase in 
aggregate income “raises all boats,” then age-specific relative income satisfies 
(9)  4Ju/4J,o = (yi/YJ4~i; 
the deflator +, adjusts for changes in the population  age distribution  so that 
aggregation is consistent. 252  Daniel McFadden 
To examine the assumption  that the age distribution of  relative income is 
stationary, I run the regression (7) on the U.S. Census Public Use Samples for 
1940, 1960, 1970, and  1980.? The estimation  results  are given in table 7.9. 
Figure 7.8 shows the age distributions of  income, and figure 7.9 shows these 
distributions normalized by income in the 40-44  age bracket, for each census 
year. There is stability in the relative income distributions between  1960 and 
1980. However, the elderly are substantially poorer in the 1940  relative income 
profile. This is due in part to the lingering effects of a decade of depression 
but shows primarily the contrast of the status of the elderly before and after 
full implementation of the Social Security system. Figure 7.10 shows the  1970 
income distribution with 95 percent confidence bounds. One sees that the dis- 
tribution is tightly determined up to age 75, but that the confidence bounds are 
larger for older individuals, so that trends are less reliably determined for the 
very old. 
I conclude from this analysis that the age distribution of  income is indeed 
stable after World War 11. Provided there are no major changes in the Social 
Security  system over the next century, it is not unreasonable  to assume that 
the age distribution of income will remain stable. Factors that could alter this 
conclusion would be (  1) high immigration rates of relatively unskilled workers, 
which would tend to flatten the income distribution at younger ages, (2)  a de- 
clining share of  manufacturing and unskilled jobs, which would tend to post- 
pone the peak, and (3) delays in retirement, which would postpone the decline 
after the peak.‘ 
I next examine the  age distribution  of  housing  consumption  in the  1940, 
1960, 1970, and  1980 Census Public Use Samples, using  the Mankiw-Weil 
model (6) adapted to five-year cohorts, 
Rather than impute a value to rental property, I run these regressions only on 
home owners. To correct for selection bias caused by  endogenous choice of 
tenure, I estimate probit models of tenure choice, of the form 
Then, an inverse Mills ratio calculated from this probit equation is added to 
equation (1  0) to absorb the nonzero conditional expectation of  in the pres- 
ence of selection; see Henderson and Ioannides (1983) for a discussion of se- 
lection due to tenure choice. 
Table 7.10 gives the probit model estimates. In specification (1  l),  the proba- 
3. Income and house value were not collected in the 1950 Public Use Sample. 
4. Note that under retirement policies prevailing over the past several decades, average retire- 
ment age is falling and length of  life  in retirement  is rising sharply. It  is possible  that policy 
changes in the next several decades to reduce the burden of the Social Security system will reverse 
these trends. Table 7.9  Individual Income by Age (thousand 1982 $) 
1940  I960  1970  I980 
Standard  Standard  Standard  Standard 








































-  I  .735 
Observations  51,159 
Standard Error  8.016 





















































































0.171  -1.285 
0.110  -1.477 
0.110  -1.071 
0.119  0.735 
0.121  7.393 
0.138  11.775 
0.155  14.626 
0.157  16.052 
0.148  16.213 
0.139  15.704 
0.143  14.679 
0.149  13.746 
0. I60  1 I .630 
0.179  8.027 
0.205  7.390 
0.252  6.156 
0.342  6.484 
0.553  4.789 
1.059  3.862 
2. I25 
63.408  58,706 
16.316  I 5.869 
22.754  26.225 
0.124 
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Fig. 7.9  Relative income by age 
bility of ownership is related to income and, via the terms Yhr,  to the size and 
age composition of the household. The estimates for 1960, 1970, and 1980 are 
qualitatively similar. Small children living at home have a small positive im- 
pact on ownership. Individuals between the ages of 20 and 30 have a negative 
impact,  obviously  because  they  are forming  new  households  without  the 
wealth required for home purchase. This effect became significantly stronger 
in 1980, compared with the earlier census years. There is a sharply increasing 
positive impact beginning  at age 30 and peaking around age 70. The model Table 7.10  Probability of Home Ownership (binomial probit) 
I940  I960  1970  1980 
Standard  Standard  Standard  Standard 
Variables  Coefficient  Deviation  Coefficient  Deviation  Coefficient  Deviation  coefficient  Deviation 
Number aged 0-4 
Number aged 5-9 
Number aged 10-14 
Number aged 15-19 
Number aged 20-24 
Number aged 25-29 
Number aged 30-34 
Number aged 35-39 
Number aged 40-44 
Number aged 45-49 
Number aged 50-54 
Number aged 55-59 
Number aged 60-64 
Number aged 65-69 
Number aged 70-74 
Number aged 75-79 
Number aged 80-84 
Number aged 85-89 
Number aged 90-94 
Number aged 95 + 
Constant 
HH income 
























0.010  0.08 I 
0.010  0.086 
0.009  0.088 
0.009  0.016 
0.010  -0.201 
0.01 1  0.042 
0.012  0.205 
0.013  0.306 
0.013  0.35 I 
0.013  0.4 14 
0.013  0.453 
0.015  0.452 
0.016  0.518 
0.018  0.587 
0.021  0.6 I8 
0.028  0.597 
0.039  0.610 
0.068  0.574 
0.133  0.386 
0.23  1  0.01  1 
0.017  -0.685 
0.002  0.024 
0.048  -0.148 
Observations  51,159  50,795 
Share owners  0.564  0.645 
Percent correct  0.640  0.704 
0.009 
0.010 
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Fig. 7.10  1970 Income by age (with 95% confidence bounds) 
implies that the impact of household size is the sum of the impacts of its mem- 
bers of various ages. This specification is likely to miss scale effects with fam- 
ily size and thus to overpredict ownership for large families and underpredict 
ownership for small ones. In the range of  the data, the marginal effect of in- 
come on ownership is positive but decreasing and is near zero over age 80. In 
part, the last phenomenon may be due to the fact that ownership is closely tied 
to permanent income, and current income for the elderly is not necessarily a 
good proxy for permanent income. The 1940 estimates show a somewhat dif- 
ferent pattern, with the number of individuals between ages 30 and 39 having 
a small impact on ownership, presumably  because these individuals did not 
have the assets required to form households or purchase property  during the 
depression, in what would otherwise have been a prime decade for house pur- 
chase. The marginal effect of income is positive and increasing. 
Table 7.11 reports the house value regression (10) for owners, with and with- 
out the inverse Mills ratio correction for selection bias. I have not corrected 
the standard errors of  the coefficients to account for the fact that the inverse 
Mills ratio is estimated, but the probit model coefficients are so precisely deter- 
mined in samples of this size that the corrections would be negligible. Table 
7.12 gives the housing regression estimates, relative to age 40-44,  for  1970, 
unadjusted  and adjusted for selection. The table includes cohort averages of 
the estimates obtained by Mankiw and Weil. These profiles are plotted in figure 
7.11. I find that the regressions in table 7.12 give a sharper peak than do the 
Mankiw-Weil estimates. One possible explanation for this is that the procedure 
that Mankiw and Weil use to impute value to rental units overstates the value 
of  these units for the very young  or for the elderly, relative to middle-aged 
individuals. Another is that the inverse Mills ratio, which depends on house- 
hold income, is correlated with an omitted income effect on housing consump- 257  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
tion in equation (lo), so that the adjusted regression overcorrects for selection. 
Investigation of these alternatives is left for future research. 
One would expect that individuals with relatively high demand for housing 
services are more likely to select ownership,  so that  selection would  lead a 
regression on owners to overstate population mean housing consumption. Fur- 
ther, the selection correction should be weakest for population cohorts where 
ownership rates are very high, and strongest for cohorts where rates are near 
one-half. I find a relatively  small correction for selection, which goes in the 
expected direction, reducing the consumption levels of the young and the old 
relative to the middle-aged. 
In analysis of housing demand, I use the 1970 housing consumption rela- 
tives, obtained from the regression adjusted for selection. Figure 7.12 shows 
95 percent  confidence bounds  for this profile.  The curve is precisely  deter- 
mined for individuals up to age 85, but is less accurate for the very old. Follow- 
ing Mankiw and Weil, I will make the assumption that the profile in figure 7.12 
is stationary through time, with aggregate income and price affecting aggre- 
gate housing  demand but  not  age-specific  relative demand. Microeconomic 
considerations suggest that this assumption cannot be correct, as housing mar- 
kets embody substantial transactions costs that will to some degree “lock in” 
individuals to historical housing units and induce a profile of consumption that 
is sensitive to history. In particular, periods of high income growth, not fully 
anticipated, will in the presence  of transactions  costs lead the elderly to lag 
further behind in relative housing consumption, while periods of unanticipated 
capital gains will tend to raise the consumption of individuals holding housing 
assets at the start of the period  relative to individuals who enter the market 
later. 
An empirical assessment of the importance of transaction cost effects, and 
the consequent instability in the profile of relative housing consumption, can 
be made by comparing profiles  estimated  for different census years.  Figure 
7.13 shows housing consumption profiles,  in real dollars, obtained from the 
adjusted regressions in table 7.11. These profiles  show an upward drift over 
time, as expected given real per capita income growth over this period. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that there is no systematic increase for the very young or 
very old, but the statistics for the latter group are not determined very precisely. 
Recall from figure 7.8 that real income increased substantially from 1960 to 
1970, across all cohorts, but increased very little from 1970 to  1980. On the 
other hand, real housing consumption increased substantially in both decades. 
This suggests either that user cost of housing was lower in the decade of  the 
1970s, and demand was sensitive to user cost, or else that transactions costs 
were sufficient to “lock in” consumers to unintended housing consumption at 
the end of the  1970s. 
Figure 7.14 shows the housing consumption profiles for 1940, 1960, 1970, 
and 1980  relative to consumption at ages 40-44.  These profiles are remarkably 
stable between 1960  and 1980. The profile for 1940 shows less relative housing 258  Daniel McFadden 
Table 7.11  Housing Consumption by Age 
1940  1960 
Variable: 
Age  Unadjusted  Standard  Adjusted  Standard  Unadjusted  Standard  Adjusted  Standard 
























-0.583  0.435 
-2.497  0.404 
-2.149  0.365 
-2.030  0.346 
2.754  0.376 
6.859  0.419 
12.012  0.429 
15.170  0.414 
17.156  0.407 
17.478  0.405 
15.994  0.408 
12.877  0.443 
12.863  0.469 
11.536  0.524 
10.601  0.629 
11,408  0.840 
9.093  1.190 
12.170  2.020 
7.040  3.842 
-1.875  7.279 
NA  NA 
22.3 I0 
32.538 
-2.717  0.437 
-3.378  0.400 
-2.525  0.360 
-2.479  0.342 
0.893  0.377 
3.129  0.438 
7.319  0.461 
10.699  0.444 
13.081  0.432 
14.022  0.421 
13.222  0.416 
10.475  0.447 
11.010  0.468 
9.522  0.522 
8.718  0.625 
9.265  0.831 
7.430  1.175 
11.652  1.991 
6.109  3.787 
-3.857  7.175 
13.029  0.509 
22,310 
32.07  I 
3.034  0.309 
0.733  0.307 
-0.324  0.311 
-1.295  0.364 
4.792  0.484 
14.354  0.445 
18.321  0.396 
20.593  0.366 
20.598  0.367 
18.583  0.362 
17.376  0.367 
15.612  0.394 
15.441  0.432 
13.016  0.467 
12.145  0.538 
9.342  0.690 
10.973  1.029 
8.656  1.659 
6.946  3.514 
5.985  7.140 
NA  NA 
32,772 
33.468 
2.430  0.308 
0.841  0.304 
-0.188  0.309 
-  1.575  0.362 
0.745  0.513 
10.335  0.476 
15.229  0.417 
18.015  0.381 
18.222  0.379 
16.550  0.370 
15.499  0.374 
13.377  0.404 
13.226  0.440 
10.847  0.473 
9.918  0.543 
7.152  0.692 
9.244  1.024 
7.244  1.648 
5.360  3.488 
3.073  7.087 





P  s 0.8 
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5- 
With 95% Confidence Bounds 
1970  1980 
Variable: 
Coefficient  Deviation  Coefficient  Deviation  Coefficient  Deviation  Coefficient  Deviation  Cohort 
Unadjusted  Standard  Adjusted  Standard  Unadjusted  Standard  Adjusted  Standard  Age 
4.350  0.384 
1.344  0.314 
0.665  0.297 
1.064  0.325 
5.098  0.433 
17.393  0.435 
20.983  0.439 
24.092  0.274 
24.267  0.391 
22.339  0.362 
20.159  0.369 
17.860  0.385 
17.050  0.414 
16.396  0.473 
15.143  0.544 
13.570  0.681 
13.630  0.940 
11.520  1.486 
15.215  2.912 
15.134  5.240 
NA  NA 
39,851 
36.670 
3.751  0.386 
1.418  0.312 
0.707  0.296 
1.052  0.324 
1.764  0.463 
13.849  0.469 
.  18.552  0.454 
21.990  0.438 
22.754  0.410 
21.066  0.366 
18.796  0.373 
16.357  0.390 
15.291  0.421 
14.123  0.483 
12.746  0.555 
10.734  0.692 
9.143  0.301 
9.326  1.482 
12.787  2.901 
15.251  5.214 
11.122  0.552 
39,85 1 
36.479 
2.708  0.473 
0.941  0.404 
-1.033  0.377 
5.300  0.433 
19.507  0.435 
27.391  0.432 
30.287  0.473 
29.293  0.491 
26.156  0.477 
23.423  0.432 
22.585  0.423 
20.601  0.462 
19.124  0.510 
18.461  0.598 
16.785  0.749 
17.202  1.050 
14.009  1.535 
11.855  2.427 
NA  NA 
NA  NA 
52,280 
48.148 
-0.069  0.444 
4.074  0.493 
0.917  0.459 
1.701  0.418 
-0.315  0.389 
6.341  0.493 
20.237  0.513 
27.338  0.470 
30.159  0.500 
29.068  0.515 
26.068  0.498 
23.578  0.454 
22.464  0.449 
20.543  0.502 
18.553  0.575 
17.466  0.700 
14.208  0.900 
14.651  1.277 
10.304  1.917 
8.033  2.935 
NA  NA 
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Table 7.12  1970 Housing Consumption Relative to Age 40-44 
Age  Unadjusted  Adjusted 
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Fig. 7.14  Relative housing consumption 
consumption for the cohorts between ages 25 and 39 than is observed in the 
later censuses. This is almost certainly attributable to the lack  of  consumer 
confidence and shortage of liquidity during the depression, when these cohorts 
might normally have been rapidly increasing their housing consumption. From 
this figure, I conclude that there is empirical justification for an assumption 
that the relative housing consumption profile is stable over time. 
I use the  1970 adjusted regression  coefficients, relative to the age 40-44 
cohort, multiplied by  the  US. population  from tables 7.1-7.3,  to form esti- 
mates of  housing  demand at  1970 income and prices. Table 7.13 gives this 
demographic factor, normalized to one in 1982. Also calculated in this table is 
the aggregation factor 9,  that will appear when individual income effects are 
aggregated. Figure 7.15 plots the demographic factor. 
7.5  Supply and Demand for Housing 
Supply of  new  housing per capita is modeled as a log linear function of 
current housing price, GNP per capita, and the mortgage inrerest rate, 
log['z]  1  1 
1 
= 8, + 8,  log  Housing price, 
GNP per capita,  + 8,  Intr,, 
log['%]  = 8, + 8,  log  1 
GNP per capita,  + 8,  Intr,,  1 
where the variables Table 7.13  Income Aggregation Factor and Demographic Demand Factor 
Income  Demographic 

























0.926  0.277 
0.929  0.283 
0.931  0.289 
0.934  0.296 
0.937  0.302 
0.939  0.309 
0.945  0.3 I7 
0.951  0.325 
0.958  0.333 
0.964  0.341 
0.970  0.350 
0.973  0.357 
0.975  0.365 
0.978  0.373 
0.98 1  0.381 
0.984  0.389 
0.986  0.395 
0.989  0.40  I 
0.992  0.407 
0.995  0.413 
0.997  0.419 
0.999  0.427 
I .Ooo  0.435 
1.001  0.443 
Income  Demographic 


























1.099  0.668 
1.091  0.677 
1.082  0.687 
1.074  0.696 
1.065  0.706 
1.057  0.716 
1.048  0.724 
1.038  0.732 
1.029  0.740 
1.020  0.749 
1.012  0.757 
1.007  0.763 
1.002  0.769 
0.997  0.775 
0.992  0.780 
0.988  0.786 
0.990  0.793 
0.993  0.800 
0.995  0.807 
0.998  0.814 
I .000  0.821 
I  .008  0.832 
1.015  0.843 
I .023  0.855 
Income  Demographic 

























1.183  1.283 
1.185  1.290 
1.187  1.298 
1.190  1.305 
1.192  1.313 
1.194  1.320 
1.195  1.327 
1.196  1.334 
1.197  1.341 
1.198  1.348 
1.198  1.355 
1.197  1.361 
1.196  1.368 
1.195  1.375 
1.194  1.382 
1.193  1.388 
1.191  1.394 
1.188  1.400 
1.186  1.405 
1.184  1.411 
1.181  1.417 
1.179  1.420 
1.176  I .423 
1.173  1.427 
Income  Demographic 

























1.161  I .437 
1.161  I .436 
1.161  1.436 
1.161  I .435 
1.161  1.435 
1.161  I .434 
1.161  1.432 
1.161  I .43 I 
1.161  I .429 
I. 162  1.427 
1.162  1.426 
1.162  1.424 
1.163  I .423 
1.163  1.421 
1.163  I .420 
1.163  1.418 
1.163  1.417 
1.163  1.416 
1.163  1.415 
1.163  1.413 
1.163  1.412 
1.163  1.412 
1.163  1.411 


























I .002  0.452 
I .ow  0.460 
I .009  0.468 
1.014  0.475 
I .020  0.483 
1.025  0.490 
1.03  1  0.498 
1.038  0.504 
1.046  0.51 1 
1.054  0.5 I7 
1.061  0.523 
1.069  0.530 
1.076  0.537 
I  .082  0.544 
I .088  0.551 
1.095  0.559 
1.101  0.566 
1.104  0.575 
1.108  0.584 
1.111  0.594 
1.115  0.603 
1.1 18  0.613 
1.114  0.623 
1.111  0.634 
1. I07  0645 



























1.03  1  0.867 
1.039  0.878 
1.048  0.894 
1.057  0.91 I 
1.066  0.927 
I .076  0.944 
I .085  0.961 
1.094  0.980 
1.103  1 .ow 
1.112  1.020 
1.121  1.040 
1.130  I .06 I 
1.136  1.080 
1.142  1.099 
1.147  1.118 
1.153  1.138 
1.158  1.158 
1.163  1.174 
1.168  1.190 
1.173  I .207 
1.178  1.223 
1.183  1.24 I 
1.183  1.249 
1.183  1.257 
1.183  1.266 



























1.171  1.430 
1.168  1.433 
1.167  I .435 
1.165  1.436 
1.163  1.437 
1.162  I .438 
1.160  1.440 
1.160  1.440 
1.159  1.440 
1.159  1.440 
1.159  1.440 
1.158  1.440 
1.159  I .440 
1.159  1.440 
1.159  1.440 
1.159  1.440 
1.160  1.439 
1.160  I .439 
1.160  1.439 
1.160  1.439 
1.161  1.439 
1.161  1.439 
1.161  1.438 
1.161  1.438 
1.161  1.438 




























1.162  1.410 
1.162  1.409 
1.162  1.408 
1.162  1.407 
1.162  1.406 
1.163  1.405 
1.163  I .403 
1.163  1.402 
1.163  1.401 
1.163  I .400 
1.163  I .399 
1.163  I .398 
1.163  1.396 
1.164  I .395 
1.164  1.393 
1.164  I .392 
1.164  1.391 
1.164  1.389 
1.164  I .388 
1.164  1.386 
1.164  1.385 
1.164  1.383 
1.164  1.382 
1.164  1.380 
1.164  1.379 
1.164  1.378 
1.163  1.376 264  Daniel McFadden 
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Fig. 7.15  Housing demand demographic factor 
Invest =  real  constant-quality  housing  investment  (in  1982 
dollars), 
U.S.  population  (in thousands), 
real quality-adjusted price (in 1982 dollars), and 
home mortgage interest rate, 
Pop = 
Housing price = 
Intr = 
are taken from tables 7.1-7.3,  7.7, and 7.8. This model is loosely justified by 
an argument that the economy has a production frontier for housing and other 
goods, and competition will result in observations on this frontier where mar- 
ginal revenue equals price. A C.E.S. frontier, for example, will yield a relation- 
ship like equation (  lq5 
Equation (12) was estimated by generalized least squares (GLS), with a cor- 
rection for first-order serial correlation, using data for the years  1947-88.  To 
handle endogeneity of  housing price, the model was also estimated by  GLS 
after replacing log housing price with  a fitted value from a regression  on a 
constant, the home mortgage interest rate, the rate of inflation, log GNP per 
capita, log population, log demographic demand factor, and log real housing 
stock. The standard errors in the two-stage procedure are not corrected for the 
first-stage estimation. The model was also estimated by  an instrumental vari- 
ables (IV) procedure, ignoring serial correlation. The estimates for these mod- 
els are given in table 7.14. This table also gives estimates for the observation 
5. Suppose housing H  and nonhousing goods N are produced subject to a C.E.S. frontier Z = 
[H""  + AN""]""+"',  where Z  is  the primary  input. Assume competitive industries maximize 
revenue G  = pH + N, where p  is the real price of housing. Then G = Zr(p),  where n(.)  is a 
revenue function, and one has H  = G~r~(p)/r(p)  is linear in G and increasing in p.  Equation (14) 
is of this form, with an added parameter to allow for nonconstant returns to scale. 265  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
Table 7.14  Housing Supply Regressions-Dependent  Variable: Log Real Housing 
Investment per Capita (Standard errors in parentheses) 
Model 
Observation period 
Estimator  1947-88  1947-88  1947-88  1900-88  1900-88  1900-88 
Variables  GLS  2SGLS  IV  GLS  2SGLS  IV 
Constant  -10.120  -8.783  -8.759  -17.240  -2.236  -3.323 
(2.833)  (2.274)  (1.548)  (3.941)  (74.03)  (5.870) 
Log GNP per capita  1.085  0.977  0.959  1.899  0.299  0.332 
(0.303)  (0.286)  (0.165)  (0.425)  (7.854)  (0.632) 
Log real housing price  1.200  2.510  1.982  -0.486  2.997  1.678 
(1.001)  (1.340)  (0.780)  (0.904)  (15.028)  (1.178) 
Nominal interest rate  -0.079  -0.094  -0.082  -0.125  -0.101  -0.034 
(0.020)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.040)  (0.120)  (0.024) 
Rate of  inflation  -0.008  -0.007  -0.006  -0.008  -0.004  -0.002 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.01  1) 
Rho  0.405  0.379  NA  0.887  0.883  NA 
Observations  42.000  42.000  42.000  81.000  81.000  81.000 
Standard error  0.088  0.084  0.102  0.232  0.236  0.263 
period  1900-88,  excluding the war years 1917-18  and  1941-46  when supply 
restrictions were in place. 
The estimates for 1947-88  imply that new housing investment is approxi- 
mately homogeneous in GNP and responds negatively to the mortgage interest 
rate, reflecting the impact of the cost of working capital. Supply is found to be 
quite price elastic, with an elasticity value of  1.98 in the IV regression. This is 
in the range found by other authors using different data constructions and time 
periods  (see Poterba  1984; Tope1 and  Rosen  1988). The  estimates  for the 
longer observation period are less well determined. The IV regression gives a 
comparable price elasticity of supply but shows a much weaker elasticity with 
respect to GNP. These results provide mixed support for the stability  of  the 
supply relationship. In further analysis, I use the IV estimates of equation (12) 
based on post-World  War I1 data (model  [3]). An important feature of this 
model, which plays a critical role in the final results  in this paper, is that at 
fixed real housing prices, housing investment expands nearly in proportion to 
GNP. This implies that if housing demand at fixed real prices grows less than 
linearly in GNP, due to demographic factors or a low income elasticity, then 
there will necessarily  be downward movement of  prices, even with growing 
demand for housing. 
The specification  of  demand  starts  from a simple age-specific individual 
demand function. Consider an individual in cohort i in year t, and assume that 266  Daniel McFadden 
his or her  real  housing  demand, denoted  D,,, differs from the  demand  of  a 
person of the same cohort in base year 0 only because of differences  in real 
income or real user cost of housing, with the functional form 
(13) 
where $$,  is real income, u, is real user cost, and the a,, are the age-specific 
selection-adjusted housing demand coefficients obtained using the  1970 cen- 
sus and given in table 7.12. This equation  can be derived from the indirect 
utility function 
(14) 
where C is a constant that collects the base-year variable values. 
constructed in table 7.13 can be defined, except for normalization, as 
D,, = a,&*,,  /$,,>'exp(Wu, -  u,)), 
V,,=+~,-~/(l  -  y) -  X-'a,,exp(C + Xu,), 
Recall from equation (8) that $z,/$,o = (Yl/Y,)/+,.  The demographic factor 
,=I  I= I 
The individual demand functions can then be aggregated across cohorts, given 
the population profile, to obtain aggregate housing demand, 
(16)  D, = A F, Yy  exp(hu,) +,T, 
where A is a constant. For econometric analysis, I work with the model 
(17)  log(D,/F,) = log(A) + Xu, + ylog(Y,/$,) + v, 
Because  of transactions  costs, consumers  are likely to adjust slowly toward 
desired housing consumption  levels. To  incorporate  this effect, I consider a 
partial adjustment version of model (1  7), 
(18)  log(D,/F,) = 8log(D,-,/F,_  + (I -  O)log(A) 
where 1 -  8 is the adjustment rate. 
I estimate equations (17) and (18) using data from tables 7.7 and 7.8, with 
demand defined as the real constant-quality housing stock. The fitted demand 
equations for  the  four  models  of  expectations described  earlier  (denoted 
LAG1, LAG3, LEAD1, and LEAD3) and the corresponding  user cost meas- 
ures are given in tables 7.15-7.18.  Each equation is estimated for the period 
1900-88,  excluding the war years, and also for the period  1947-88. 
Let y  = Xp  + E denote equation (17), with E  assumed to follow an autore- 
gressive process of order one (ARl),  process with serial correlation p. First, I 
estimate this equation by GLS. Next, to accommodate possible endogenicity 
of the price of housing that enters user cost, I apply Durbin's transformation, 
(19) 
and estimate  this equation by instrumental variables (IV), without imposing 
+ (I  -e)xu, + (1 -  e)yiog(y,), 
Y = PY-, + XP -  X-,(PP) + v3 267  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
the nonlinear constraint on parameters, and use this equation to estimate p. The 
instruments  used are a constant, log population,  the home mortgage interest 
rate, the inflation rate, the log of aggregation-adjusted GNP per capita and its 
lagged  value, and one and two period  lags of  the dependent variable. This 
method is consistent even if user cost and the lagged dependent variable are 
correlated with the disturbance. Finally, I do IV estimation of  the pth differ- 
ence equation 
(20)  y -  py-, = (X  -  PX-,)P + u, 
using the estimate of p from the preceeding IV regression. 
A potential problem with these demand estimates is that some of  the instru- 
ments, such as GNP per capita and the mortgage rate, are in fact jointly deter- 
mined along with housing prices by macroeconomic equilibrium and thus may 
themselves be correlated with the disturbances in these regressions. 
I first summarize the results in tables 7.15 and 7.16 for the demand equation 
(17) without partial adjustment. The income elasticities, as measured by the 
endogenity-corrected  pth difference estimates, are relatively insensitive to the 
definition of  user cost or to the observation period,  with values between 0.2 
and 0.5. There is no consistent pattern to the coefficients of user cost, with 
the regressions for the full period giving responses that are insignificant or of 
unexpected  sign, and the regressions  for 1950-88  giving responses  that  are 
mostly of expected sign, but not consistently significant. 
If  the partial adjustment effect 0 introduced in equation (18) is significant, 
then equation (17) is misspecified, and its estimated coefficients are biased.6 
Equation (1  8) has the form 
and Durbin's transformation yields 
I report the GLS results, but they are biased due to the lagged dependent vari- 
able. To obtain consistent estimates, I apply IV to Durbin's transformation of 
equation (1  8), using the same instruments as for equation (17), without impos- 
ing nonlinear parameter restrictions. The coefficients of  y-, and y-2 define a 
quadratic whose roots are estimates of 0 and p; I use these, with the relative 
coefficients of X  and X-,  used to identify which root estimates  p.  I then use 
this estimate to form the pth difference equation, 
6.  The bias in IV estimates of model (17) when the specification (I  8) is true can be worked out 
by rewriting equation (17) as 
where lags are denoted by  subscripts and the disturbance 
variables. 
is orthogonal to the right-hand-side Table 7.15  Demand Functions for Model (17): Observations 1900-88, except 1917-18 and 1941-46 (standard errors below coefficient estimates) 
Regression 
(1)  (2) 
Expectations model  LAG1  LAG1 









4.880  0.367 
1.276  0.127 
0.219  -0.094 
0.208  0.130 
0.29.5  -0.022 
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LEAD3  LEAD3 
IV  1V on 
p-Dirf 
0.205  0.494 
0.054  0.033 
0.229  0.068 
0.147  0.218 
0.136  0.348 
0.032  0.034 
0.010 





76  76 
0.997  0.575 
0.014  0.023 







User cost, LAG1 
Adjusted income, LAG1 
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4'-  PYX -  -  Wy-, -  pv-J  + (X  -  pX-,)P + u, 
which I estimate by IV. 
Summarizing the estimates  of  the partial adjustment  model  (18) in tables 
7.17 and 7.18, there are again substantial differences between the coefficients 
from regressions run on the full period  1900-88  and on the truncated period 
1947-88.  This may  reflect  a regime  change in macroeconomic structure  or 
housing finance after World War 11, special problems of disequilibrium  in the 
1930s, or problems in consistent measurement of variables early in the century. 
Another factor that may be important is the fairly rapid decrease in household 
size over the  1960-88  period, due to reduced  number of children and to  in- 
creased household formation from delayed marriage, increased divorce rates, 
and  increased  rates of  elderly  living  alone. In  several cases, the estimation 
method applied to the  1900-88  observation period does not yield a real esti- 
mate for the  serial  correlation  coefficient, and the pth  difference  regression 
cannot be run. Whenever these regressions are available, in either the full or 
post-World  War I1 data, they give income elasticities near 0.2, no matter what 
the expectations  model. Estimates of the partial adjustment parameter 8 vary 
from 0.3 to 0.6 in the 1947-88 data, depending on the expectations model. The 
one consistent estimate for the full data is 0.8. The postwar data estimates then 
imply  long-run  income elasticities  between 0.2 and 0.6. The coefficients of 
user cost vary with both the expectations model and the observation period but 
are generally insignificant for the longer period. Concentrating on the regres- 
sions from the 1947-88  period, the long-run response to a unit increase in user 
cost ranges from -0.2  to -0.3.  These values imply very small elasticities with 
respect to housing price: In the LEAD3 expectations  model, a uniform  100 
percent increase in housing price yields, on average over 1947-88,  a long-run 
decrease of  1.4 percent in housing demand. 
There are insufficient differences in overall fit to sharply discriminate be- 
tween the different expectations models. The lack of strong evidence support- 
ing forward-looking rather than naive expectations is consistent with the find- 
ings  of  Ai  et  al.  (1990)  from  panel  data  that  households  are  relatively 
insensitive to user  costs, particularly  the capital  gains  component. Skinner 
(1989) also finds myopic behavior. The possibility that households make sub- 
stantial intergenerational gifts or bequests, mitigating the cross-cohort effects 
of housing price variations, has been examined by Skinner (1989) and M. Hurd 
(personal communication). They find dissaving among the elderly too low to 
be easily explained by one-generation life-cycle behavior unless risk aversion 
is very strong. On the other hand, this behavior does not appear to be systemati- 
cally related to bequest motives, as it does not depend on number of children 
or children's economic status. 
On the basis of the results in tables 7.15-7.18,  I selected the LEAD3 model, 
fitted to post-World  War I1 data, for further analysis. It appears unlikely that 







User cost, LAG1 
Adjusted income, LAG1 
Dependent variable, LAG I 



















































































-  0.059 
0.021 
I .625 








LAG3  LEADl 
IV on  GLS 
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(32)  (33)  (34) 
LEAD1  LEAD1  LEAD3 
IV  IV on  GLS 
p-Diff 
0.117  0.204 
0.034  0.124 
0.067  -0.132 
0.075  0.050 
0.m  0.08  I 
0.022  0.0  I3 
0.020 
0.037 
-0.07  I 
0.022 
1.578  0.879 
0.085  0.025 
--0.629 
0.077 
I8  77 
0.999  0.999 
0.008  0.009 
NC  0.790 
NC  0.879 
(3.5)  (36) 
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NC Table 7.18  Demand Functions for Model (18): Observations 1947-88  (standard errors below coefficient estimates) 
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LAG3  LAG3 
IV  IVon 
p-Diff 
0.219  0.261 
0.072  0.040 
-0.166  0.228 
0.096  0.099 
0.147  0.2W 
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IXADI  LEAD3 
IV on  GLS 
p-l)iff 
0.259  0.020 
0.03 I  0.097 
-0.105  -0.119 
0.042  0.058 
0.200  0.149 
0.03  I  0.041 
0.444  0.820 
0.045  0.04  I 
41  39 
0 894  0 999 
0 006  0 on6 
0 899  0 544 
0 444  0 820 
LEAD3  LEAD3 
IV  IV on 
p-Dit.1. 
0.172  0.268 
0.058  0.034 
-0.241  -0.196 
0.075  0.081 
0. I63  0.  I94 





1.244  0.307 
0.104  0.066 
-0.293 
0.OY3 
39  39 
1.000  0.709 
O.OM  0.007 
0.928  0.928 
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conclusions of the study, although short-run dynamics will obviously depend 
on this choice. It is also unlikely that the analysis would be much affected by 
using rational expectations rather than the LEAD3 perfect foresight expecta- 
tions. In the equilibrium I obtain, the LEAD3 expectations are highly predict- 
able from the information set at each time period, and the equilibrium does not 
have change points or sharp breaks where rational expectations  might differ 
significantly from the LEAD3 expectations. 
For projections, I need auxiliary forecasts of the inflation rate, real GNP per 
capita, the home mortgage rate, the property tax rate, and the marginal income 
tax rate. The following regressions are used; t-Statistics are given in parenthe- 
ses. Log price index for GNP (LPGNP): 
(21)  LPGNP = 0.2516 + 0.0023(year - 1990) + 1.77049 LPGNP-, 
(2.86)  (2.77)  (12.05) 
- 1.1747 LPGNP-,  + 0.70223 LPGNP-, -  0.2591 LPGNP-, 
(-3.96)  (2.14)  (-0.92) 
(-0.7 1) 
-0.0909  LPGNP-,, 
1950-88  sample,  R2 = 0.9995. 
Log GNP per capita (LGNPC): 
(22)LGNPC = 2.5513 + 0.00516 (year - 1990) + 0.73946 LGNPC-,, 
(2.49)  (2.34)  (7.02) 
1950-88  sample,  R2 = 0.9893. 
Nominal mortgage interest rate (MORTR): 
(23)  (0.96)  (4.58) 
+ 0.8718 MORTR-,, 
(23.66) 
MORTR = 0.  25365 + 0.2151 (inflation rate, GNP index) 
1950-88  sample,  R2 = 0.9617. 
I assume the property tax rate and marginal income tax rate remain at 1989 
levels. The annual Rrowth rutes of  the auxiliary variables follow: 
Variable 
Growth Rate  Growth Rate 
1950-89  1990-2100 
GNP price deflator (PGNP)  4.06 
1.97 
Nominal mortgage interest rate (MORTR)  2.76 
Demographic factor in housing demand  1.41 





A potential problem with the preceding analysis of the market for housing 
is that the estimated  serial correlation coefficients in the demand and supply 274  Daniel McFadden 
functions are near one, suggesting that these variables may have unit roots and 
cointegrating relationships. I have tested log real GNP per capita, log housing 
investment, log housing stock, the GNP implicit price deflator, and the home 
mortgage interest rate for unit roots, using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on 
annual observations from 1869 through  1989. I do the tests with and without 
the maintained hypothesis of a deterministic trend. To take partial account of 
moving-average effects introduced by demographic factors, I include five years 
of lagged first differences in the variable being tested. I reject the hypothesis 
of a unit root for the GNP price deflator with a deterministic trend and other- 
wise accept the unit root hypothesis,  at the 5 percent  significance level. For 
forecasting,  I use the previous point estimates  of  autoregression coefficients 
but note, in light of  the unit root tests, that the standard errors for regression 
coefficients, and confidence bounds for forecasts, may be severely underesti- 
mated. 
7.6  Housing Market Projections 
The estimated supply and demand models for the housing market, combined 
with auxiliary forecasts, define a system that can be solved for market-clearing 
housing prices, user costs, investment, and stocks. I use supply model (3) from 
table 7.14, demand model (48) from table 7.18, and the LEAD3 expectations 
model. The following method is used to determine equilibrium in the model: 
Starting from a trial real housing price sequence from 1989 to 2100, I calculate 
nominal capital gain rates, imposing a transversality condition that real capital 
gains rates in 2098-2100  are zero. For these fixed capital gains rates, I solve 
the model by  forward recursion, obtaining a modified price sequence. I then 
adjust nominal capital gains rates partially to the new price sequence and re- 
peat  the process. The method  converges in a few-score  iterations  and takes 
about 10 seconds on a fast workstation. 
The results of the forecasting exercise are given in table 7.19. It should be 
noted that the price forecast is much smoother than the historical series, which 
is highly  volatile. The forecast is for continued  growth in housing demand, 
fueled by  rising income, which offsets the slow decline in the demographic 
factor. However, rising income also increases supply of new housing invest- 
ment, leading to steadily declining real housing  prices. The model does not 
predict  a  precipitious  decline,  although  it  does  suggest  a  substantial  fall 
through the  1990s. It is likely that a rational expectations  model with more 
forward-looking consumers would react more quickly to pending declines and 
accelerate their onset. 
The results of the projections are summarized in figures 7.16-7.18.  Figure 
7.16 shows that real housing prices fell about 7 percent from a peak in  1980 
until  1988, with a small rebound after 1986. The projections show a brief in- 
crease in 1989 and  1990, followed by  a decline that is relatively  sharp in the 
late  1990s, shallow in the 2010s, and sharper again after 2020. Figure 7.17 275  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
Table 7.19  Forecasts of Housing Market Real Stocks and Real Prices 
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Table 7.19  (continued) 
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Table 7.19  (continued) 










































0.629  6,707.3 
0.623  6.75 1.2 
0.618  6,794.5 
0.6  12  6,836.4 
0.607  6,877.3 
0.602  6,9  17.7 
0.598  6,957.8 
0.595  6,997.7 
0.591  7,037.4 
0.588  7,077.1 
0.585  7,116.7 
0.582  7,156.3 
0.579  7,196.0 
0.575  7,235.5 
0.572  7,274.8 
0.568  7,3  14.0 
0.565  7,353.3 
0.561  7,392.5 
0.557  7,43  1.3 
0.553  7,470.2 
0.548  7,508.0 
0.544  7,545.8 
0.541  7,583.9 
0.533  7,618.8 
0.527  7,65  I .9 
0.522  7,684.2 
0.517  7,716.1 
0.513  7,747.7 
0.509  7,779.8 
0.505  7,812.1 
0.502  1,845.1 
0.498  7,878.2 
0.495  7,911.6 
0.492  7,946.2 
0.489  7,981.6 
0.486  8,017.9 
0.483  8,054.7 
0.479  8,091.5 
0.478  8,130.1 
0.475  8,169.9 
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Fig. 7.17  Housing stock forecast 
shows the real, constant-quality housing stock continuing a trend that began in 
1950, with some slowing between 2020 and 2040 as the baby-boom cohorts 
disappear. 
The patterns  in  these  figures  suggest that demographic factors  will  slow 
housing market growth over the next 60 years. The offsetting effect of rising 
income will be to increase housing demand, but not rapidly  enough to keep 
pace with increasing supply of new housing at constant price, leading to steady 
price erosion. Under these projections, there will be no periods of rapid capital 
gains matching the sharp increases of 1938-55  or 1974-80.  On the other hand, 279  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
there will be no periods of precipitous capital losses that could impose an un- 
anticipated  heavy  burden  on  some elderly  cohorts,  except  for  a  few  years 
around the present. 
Figure 7.18 gives a more detailed picture of housing price behavior in the 
near term, as projected by the model. The feature of a small upturn in the first 
two forecast years is certainly related to the persistence in demand shocks and 
the use of the LEAD3 expectation model and makes no allowance for macro- 
economic cyclic conditions. More important are the market fundamentals driv- 
ing the longer-run forecast, particularly the declines after 1995. 
7.7  Welfare Implicatioiis for the Elderly 
Population  cohorts that are able to “buy low and sell high” in the housing 
market gain relative  to cohorts in  the opposite circumstance.  I examine the 
implications of  housing market changes on intergenerational distribution  by 
comparing rates of  real capital gains, proportion of  income spent on shelter, 
and  the  income  adjustments  (compensating  variations)  necessary  to equate 
utilities of different cohorts. This analysis gives a picture of the effects of the 
housing market on individuals who anticipate the housing price changes and 
adjust  savings  behavior  to  achieve  desired  life-cycle  consumption  and  be- 
quests. 
There  are  further,  and  perhaps  more  significant,  welfare  implications  of 
housing price changes for consumption and welfare in old age. Unanticipated 
price changes can cause consumption  squeezes or unintended bequests; the 
risk penalty, and cost of  carrying precautionary assets, may be an important 
welfare effect. A significant  source of  financing of  consumption  among the 
very old is extraction of housing equity. Although several authors (Feinstein 
and McFadden  1989; Venti and Wise 1990) have noted that housing transac- 
tions prior to age 70 on average do not result in extraction of equity, Ai et al. 
(1990) find that equity extraction is substantial in transactions after age 75. 
This is particularly important as an income source for surviving spouses. Hous- 
ing price volatility  that translates into a volatility  of  1-3  percent in lifetime 
income, if  concentrated into the last decade of life without compensating ad- 
justments in savings or steps to reduce risk, will lead to volatility of about 12 
percent in final decade consumption. 
To  calculate the rate of  real capital gains for a cohort,  I  assume that the 
individual purchases housing at age 30, levering the purchase with a 30 percent 
equity investment and 70 percent mortgage, and resells this housing at age 70. 
The formula 
RCG, = [(P,,4dP,)”40  -  1]/0.3, 
where P,  is real housing price, is used to calculate the rate of real capital gains. 
Figure 7.19 shows this rate for population cohorts with birth  years between 
1840 and 2030. For birth years past 1918, these calculations use the projected 280  Daniel McFadden 
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Fig. 7.19  Real rate of capital gains 
prices from figure 7.16. Cohorts born in  1880-1910, who purchased housing 
in 19  10-40,  and sold it in 1950-80, achieved real returns around 3 percent per 
year. For cohorts born between 1915 and 1945, real capital gain rates decline 
steadily from +  1 percent to -  1 percent. There is then a sharp drop to a mini- 
mum annual rate near  -3  percent for the  1960 cohort. Thereafter, the rate 
remains low for cohorts born through 1990 and then rises slightly to the range 
of  -2 percent for cohorts born thereafter. The most disadvantaged cohorts by 
this measure will then be the baby boomers that become elderly in the years 
2005-2020,  and their children born between  1980 and  1990. This suggests 281  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of  the Elderly 
the possible policy inference that substantial intergenerational redistribution to 
offset housing market effects is not needed but that it may be useful to dampen 
expectations  of  positive future housing  capital gains that  could distort  life- 
cycle savings for consumption in old age. 
A high share of income spent on shelter tends to reduce welfare, as it lowers 
consumption  of  other goods, and reflects  mostly higher housing  cost rather 
than increased housing consumption.  I have calculated  a measure  of  shelter 
share of income for each cohort by the following method. Equation (1  3) gives 
age-specific  housing  demand, which  when  combined with  the  assumption 
from equation (9) on the stability of the age distribution of income, implies 
(25) 
where Y,  is per capita income in period t and  z  is the cohort. Then, the present 
value of  the stream of service costs (PVSC) incurred by an individual born in 
year v is 
(26) 
where i(t -  v)  is the five-year cohort into which an individual of age t -  v falls 
and 6 is a discount factor. For this calculation, I use a constant discount rate of 
2.16 percent, equal to the growth rate of  real GNP per capita estimated and 
projected  over the  period  1869-2100.  Corresponding  to equation (26), the 
present value of the individual income stream is 
(27) 
where  IJJ,,  is the income of cohort i in the base year of  1970. In principle, L 
should be taken to be length of life, but I truncate the present value calculations 
at L = 70 to facilitate computation; the discount rate is sufficient to make the 
error in this approximation small. I then take the ratio of (26) to (27), normal- 
ized in  1989 to equal the share of housing in personal consumption expendi- 
tures from the Suwey of  Current Business (U.S. Department  of  Commerce, 
1990). The lifetime  share of  income spent on housing,  by  birth  cohort, is 
graphed in figure 7.20. The share was high for cohorts born before 1890, then 
dropped sharply, reaching a minimum around  1910, rose to 0.3 in  1925, and 
then remained between 0.2 and 0.3 until the end of the baby-boom cohorts. The 
share then falls steadily for cohorts after 1960. This shape can be explained by 
the relatively low income elasticity of demand for housing, near 0.3, and the 
additional effect of falling housing prices. 
The housing demand equation I have estimated integrates to an explicit util- 
ity function (14),  within which the utility impacts of  changing income or user 
cost of housing can be calculated (see also Smeeding 1989). Then, the follow- 
ing question can be addressed: If an individual born in year t faced, instead of 
his or her actual stream of  housing user costs, the stream of user costs that 
Di, = a,(Yt  l*lY,,)~exP(wut  -  U")), 
1 +L 
PVSC, = c  8t-'upl,t-,,l, 
t=\ 
,  +L 
PVINC, = c  8r-'*,"-,)  O(Y,/*,YO)? 
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Fig. 7.20  Shelter share of income 
individuals born in  1950 faced, by what percentage would income have to be 
adjusted (compensated) to keep the cohort-t individual as well off as before? 
To answer this question, I calculate the change in income in each year neces- 
sary to compensate for the change in  service cost and then take the present 
value of  these compensating changes. For small changes, the compensation 
can be calculated from the total differential, yielding the crude consumer sur- 
plus formula 
(28)  AIJJc,  = a,IJJgexp(C + Xu,) Au, = DL,Au,. 
Substituting the expression (9) for age-specific income into the age-specific 
demand  equation (14)  and  forming  the  present  value of  the  Compensating 
changes in income yields the present value of the compensation, 
Figure 7.21 plots the present value of the compensation, expressed as a per- 
centage of  the present value of  income, for cohorts born between  1869 and 
2030. Cohorts born between  1869 and  1915 would have required  a lifetime 
income reduction of  about 0.7 percent to offset the more favorable housing 
user costs they faced than were faced by the 1950 cohort. Beginning in 1910, 
the magnitude of the compensating variation is reduced sharply, remaining at 
around a 0.2 percent income reduction for the 1920-40  cohorts. There are no 
current or future cohorts that are worse off than the baby-boom cohorts, and 
only minor compensating variations are required for cohorts after 1980. 
To provide some perspective on the calculations of compensating variations 
for housing cost differences, I have also calculated the percentage adjustments 283  Demographics, the Housing Market, and the Welfare of the Elderly 
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Fig. 7.21  Compensating variations 
in income necessary to equate the present value of utility for different cohorts, 
under the assumption that all cohorts face the housing user cost series starting 
in 1950. The results suggest that intercohort inequality generated by real in- 
come growth dwarfs the effects of housing market variations. Thus, these cal- 
culations suggest that the policy issues arising from housing market volatility 
are primarily the risk exposure and ex post mistakes in life-cycle savings be- 
havior of  individuals that such volatility  may cause, and insurance  or other 
correctives for these mistakes, rather than large-scale distributional inequities 
between cohorts. 
The compensating variation calculations could be refined further. Obvious 
corrections are to eliminate the truncation of  the utility calculation at age 70 
and to take account of  individual mortality rates in forming discounted utility. 
Deeper issues are the treatment of bequest  motives and the adequacy of the 
additively separable model of intertemporal utility. In fact, a strongly concave 
transformation  of  the utility  function  (14) prior to formation  of  the present 
value of utility is probably justified, to reflect what are likely to be relatively 
low elasticities of intertemporal  substitution of consumption. If, in addition, 
the utility function is given a von Neumann-Morgenstern  interpretation to as- 
sess the welfare effects of risk, then these transformations  should reflect the 
degree of risk aversion. (As is well known, it is unlikely  that intertemporal 
substitution and risk aversion can both be described satisfactorily by an addi- 
tively separable utility function.) 284  Daniel McFadden 
7.8  Summary 
This paper has developed a framework for projecting housing market prices 
and stocks in response to demographics and income and, from these projec- 
tions, calculated the welfare effects of housing market volatility.  The results 
suggest that cohorts born in the last baby boom and after, from 1950  on, are all 
in roughly the same boat, without major cohort inequities arising from housing 
opportunities. However, these cohorts are slightly worse off than cohorts born 
in  1920-40.  The only cohorts that were substantially better off than the post- 
1950 cohorts in terms of housing were those born before 1920. 
The relatively modest compensating variations for housing cost differences 
across cohorts may mask more serious problems caused by the effects of hous- 
ing price risk on life-cycle saving and consumption levels of the elderly. Quan- 
tification of these effects will have to await further research. 
Topics for further research include construction of a demographic model of 
household formation and control for the effects of household size on housing 
demand. Further work  is needed on  savings behavior  and expectations.  A 
promising approach is to combine macroeconomic and demographic data with 
the 1989  wave of the Panel Study for Income Dynamics, which contains wealth 
inventories in  1984 and 1989 for about 2,000 elderly households. This should 
permit assessment of some major open questions about behavioral response to 
housing variables, particularly evidence about the degree of myopia in housing 
decisions, about adjustments in savings in response to anticipated capital gains, 
and about intergenerational transfers. 
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Comment  N. Gregory Mankiw 
In this paper Daniel McFadden  offers a grand theory-or,  more precisely, a 
grand prediction. He presents and estimates an econometric model of the hous- 
ing market, and he then simulates the model into the future, given the dramatic 
(and largely uncontroversial) changes that are occurring in U.S. demography. 
McFadden predicts that real housing prices will fall about 2 or 3 percent per 
year for the next 112 years. When David Weil and I made a similar prediction 
in a paper several years ago, we were bold enough to forecast out only 20 years 
(Mankiw and Weil 1989). McFadden has outdone us by 92 years. 
The Coming Real Estate Bust 
The prediction that housing prices are going to fall over the next couple of 
decades is based on a simple story about supply and demand. Cross-sectional 
data tell us that the demand for housing  is closely related to the number of 
adults in a household: as McFadden’s figure 7.11 shows, children do not gener- 
ate much housing demand. This finding implies, at the aggregate level, that the 
demand for housing is roughly proportional to the adult population. There is 
little doubt that, because of  low birthrates in the  1970s, the adult population 
will grow more slowly in the future than  it has in  the past. Hence, housing 
demand will grow more slowly as well. 
The impact of  demand on prices depends, of  course, on  the elasticity  of 
supply. If  the  supply elasticity were very  large, then fluctuations in demand 
would not influence prices much. Yet  experience  suggests that this is not the 
case. In the 1970s, when the baby-boom generation of the 1950s was reaching 
adulthood, housing prices rose substantially. This experience suggests that the 
elasticity of supply is not very large, and that housing prices will fall when the 
baby-bust generation reaches adulthood. 
This is the essence of my paper with David Weil. It is also, I believe, the 
essence of this paper by Dan McFadden. These two papers are similar in the 
“big pictures” they present. Yet, in their methodologies, the papers are quite 
different, In the most general terms, the difference between the two papers is 
that between structural and reduced-form estimation. 
Two Approaches 
The approach that McFadden takes is to estimate a structural model of the 
housing market. That is, he estimates the demand for the stock of housing and 
the supply of  residential  investment. He then  simulates  this model  into the 
future under standard demographic assumptions. By contrast, although David 
N. Gregory Mankiw is professor of  economics at Harvard University and a research associate 
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Weil and I presented and were guided by a theoretical model similar to McFad- 
den’s, we did not try to estimate it. In our empirical analysis, we relied more 
on the estimation of simple reduced-form regressions. 
As we all learned in basic econometrics, structural and reduced-form  esti- 
mation each has its own advantages. Structural estimation links empirical anal- 
ysis closer to a particular economic theory, which is an advantage if  one be- 
lieves the theory. Yet  structural estimation  imposes more restrictions  on the 
data than does reduced-form estimation; any forecast from a structural model 
is based on those restrictions as well as on past experience. For the purpose of 
forecasting, one might want to avoid imposing  any prior theoretical  restric- 
tions,  since those  restrictions  are  open  to  dispute.  Thus one  might  prefer 
reduced-form estimation.’ 
In the case at hand, however, the situation is not this simple. Since McFad- 
den’s model is dynamic, forward-looking, and nonlinear, its reduced-form  is 
complicated. It is far easier to  estimate  the  structural model, as McFadden 
does, than to solve for and estimate the model’s reduced form. For forecasting, 
therefore, it is not clear which method to prefer. One way to view the regres- 
sions that Weil and I ran is that they are approximations  to the reduced-form 
of a structural model such as McFadden’s; whether they are good approxima- 
tions is hard to tell. 
One might be tempted to conclude that McFadden’s structural model is pick- 
ing up the same phenomenon  that Weil and I emphasized in our paper, since 
the predictions are so similar. Yet I am reticent to endorse McFadden’s model 
as confirmation for our view, for the paper presents few model diagnostics. In 
particular,  I would  like to see how well McFadden’s model explains housing 
prices in sample. As a crude specification test, one could examine whether this 
structural  model  does  better  at  explaining  history  than  do much  simpler 
reduced-form equations. If it does better fitting the data in sample, that would 
provide a compelling case for the structural model; if it does worse, that would 
constitute a rejection. 
I also think McFadden could do  more with his model. For example, he could 
use it to explain historical fluctuations in the housing market, such as the large 
increase in prices in the 1970s. David Weil and I argued that this increase was 
driven largely by  demographic changes, whereas Jim Poterba (1984) has ar- 
gued that it was driven largely by changes in the user cost due to rising inflation 
and the nonindexed tax system. One could consider several historical count- 
erfactuals. What would have happened to housing prices if there had been no 
postwar baby boom? Or what would have happened if inflation had not risen 
in the 1970s? One advantage of estimating a structural model of the housing 
market is that it can be used to answer these questions. 
1. This is similar to the argument that Sims (1980) makes for the use of  vector autoregressions 
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The Generational Distribution 
McFadden  does use  his  model  to  gauge the  intergenerational  impact  of 
changes in  housing  prices.  I  am  somewhat  skeptical  about  his  conclusion. 
Comparing the lucky and unlucky generations, McFadden finds a small com- 
pensating variation: less than  1 percent of  lifetime income. 
A  back-of-the-envelope  calculation,  however, suggests a much larger  im- 
pact. Consider McFadden’s figure 7.19. According to this figure, someone born 
in 1958 (like me) can expect a real capital loss of about 3 percent per year over 
his life. His grandfather, born in 1900, received a real capital gain of 3 percent 
per  year. Therefore, the increase  in user  cost of  housing  (from this change 
alone) is about 6 percent per year. Using the conservative estimate that house 
value is about one year’s income, one reaches a compensating variation  of 6 
percent of income, almost 10 times McFadden’s estimate. McFadden’s estimate 
differs from mine in part because it incorporates various macroeconomic  fac- 
tors that influence the user cost of housing, such as changes over time in tax 
rates and interest rates. It seems more natural, however, to separate the impact 
of housing prices from that of these other factors. 
A more difficult question is what policymakers should make of all this. Here 
I agree with McFadden: probably nothing. Many things influence the relative 
income of  different  generations;  the price  of  housing  is only one of  them. 
Moreover, given the importance of  bequests in wealth accumulation, it is not 
clear how to interpret these intergenerational redistributions. It is noteworthy, 
however, that the generations that are hurt by the trends in housing prices are, 
coincidentally, also those that are hurt by  the increases in Social Security in 
the 1970s and the large budget deficits of the  1980s. Nineteen fifty-eight was 
not a good year to be born. 
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